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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

870327-CA

v*
Category No. 2

JORGE AQUILAR,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This

appeal

is

from

a

conviction

of

possession

of a

controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

District Court.

(1987),

in the Fourth Judicial

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence obtained
from defendant's van after defendant was properly stopped and
voluntarily consented to the search.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
1.

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

3.

Utah Code Annotated, § 77-7-15 (1982).
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.

4.

Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1987).
(a)

It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order or directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by
this subsection;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jorge Aquilar, was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1987), on March 23, 1987 (R. 7 ) .

On April 22, 1987, defendant moved to dismiss or in the
alternative, to suppress evidence of the, 383 pounds of marijuana
found in the defendants van

(R. 27).

On April 28, 1987, a

suppression hearing was conducted; defendant's motion was denied
(R. 39-40).
On April

29, 1987, there being no motions to continue,

defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty (R. 73-78).
On June 5, 1987, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
2

Execution of

the

sentence

was

suspended

and

defendant

placed

on

court-

supervised probation for two years, subject to defendant serving
six months in the Utah County Jail, paying a $ 1,000.00 fine and
$ 250.00 to the Victims Reparation Fund (R. 84-85).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are taken from the pretrial suppression
hearing.

Because

appellant

transcript

a part

of this appeal, it is not known whether

additional

facts

surrounding

has

the

failed

search

to

make

and

the

seizure

trial

were

presented at trial or whether the defendant even renewed his
objection at trial to the seized evidence.
On March 14, 1987 some time before 8:30 a.m., Trooper Paul
Mangleson observed defendant walking on the highway with a can of
gasoline near Nephi, Utah (R. 121). Trooper Mangleson testified
he approached the defendant, at the rate of four to five m.p.h.,
coming within four to five feet of the defendant, in an effort to
offer him a ride to his car.

The defendant completely avoided

him (R. 122). Subsequently, Trooper Mangleson positioned himself
where

he

could

observe all entrances to the three gasoline

stations in the area.

After waiting for 20 minutes Trooper

Mangleson conferred with another trooper who had witnessed the
defendant drive off 15 minutes earlier.

Thinking the defendants

behavior peculiar Trooper Mangleson radioed another trooper to
••take a close look" at defendants van (R. 122-23).

3

The defendant's own testimony denying the account given by
Trooper Mangleson, proved internally inconsistent.1
the conflicting

Resolving

testimony was not necessary, however, in the

lower court's determination.2
Officer
defendant's
approaching

Rawlinson

heard

van

almost

and

(R. 132).

the

transmission

immediately

to

watch

for

the

van

observed

Officer Rawlinson testified, "There was

[sic] two other cars in front of the van I estimated their speed
between 55 and 60 miles an hour.

The van was approximately two

car lengths behind the second vehicle which I thought was too
close to be traveling at that speed."
Rawlinson decided to follow the vehicle.

(R. 132-33).

Officer

After catching up to

defendant's van, Officer Rawlinson observed the defendant weaving
between the emergency and right driving lane.
When I first saw the vehicle it was on the white line the
[line]3 which is in the slow lane emergency lane, line
marker, the white solid line, he was driving right on top of
the line I noticed that he would go back into his lane and
then drift back over almost touching the line drift back
over into his lane drifted back over on tip of the white
line, Drifted back into his lane again on the fourt[h] time
he went back over and was on top of the line.
1

Defendant testified he filled the van's gas tank up
before proceeding, spending $16.00, (R. 109) when stopped 50
miles later his gauge revealed only a quarter tank of gas. (R.
138) .
2

The lower court found the dispositive facts to be those
associated with the Officer Rawlinson's stop of the defendant.
It considered whether Officer Rawlinson had sufficient cause to
pull defendant over (R. 147), not if Officer Mangleson had
probable cause to radio a message to watch for the defendant's van.
3

The transcript reads, ". . . the vehicle it was on the
white line the which is in the slow emergency lane,". A word was
obviously omitted.

4

(R. 133-34).

Thinking he was following a drunk driver, Officer

Rawlinson activated his emergency lights and pulled the van over
(R. 134).

When stopped, defendant was requested to produce his

driver's licence and vehicle registration.
California driver's
certificate.

Defendant produced a

licence but did not have a registration

The van had Illinois license plates (R. 135).

Officer Rawlinson stated he was confused, "what Mr. Aquilar
was doing with a California Driver's license [in] a van from
Illinois

in the middle of Utah."

inquiry, defendant

responded

(R. 135).

Upon further

that the vehicle belonged

to a

friend, but he did not know his friend's name (R. 135).
Although

Officer

Rawlinson

did

not think

the

defendant

intoxicated, he was still concerned about the defendant's driving
pattern and inquired if he had been sleeping at the wheel or if
he was tired.

Defendant responded he, "had been driving a long

ways", and had driven from both Mexico and California (R. 136).
In addition to defendant's responses, Officer Rawlinson made
other

observations,

suspicion.

which

taken

together,

further

aroused

"[On] the far door on the van the panel had been

pulled away and had been put back and had been duct taped over"
an indication of drug smuggling.
plain view.

The jack and spare were out in

A blanket on the seat appeared that it had been

slept on and the van appeared to be lived in.

Furthermore, there

was jug of gasoline which made the vehicle "wreak of gasoline",
and

to which

Officer Rawlinson

stated, "would have made me

nauseous to drive 50 miles with the fumes from the gasoline."
(R. 134-35).
5

Officer Rawlinson then testified,
[Because] he was from both Mexico and California with no
explanation of whose van it was or why he had it I decided
to check the van through dispatch to see if it was on record
of being stolen and try to find out just what was going on
and it was about that time that I invited him back to my
vehicle before I invited him back I did ask him if we could
look through the van and he said that we could do that.
(R. 136).

Officer Rawlinson described the procedures before

letting the defendant sign the consent to search form.
I held the form up in front of him (indicating) as if this
were the form it was on the clip board and he was sitting
right next to me I held it up in front of him and read it
out loud as we filled in the blanks. As we filled in the
blanks I read the entire form to him down to the point where
he signed it. Before he signed it I went back and begin
[sic] to read the form back to him again all completed.
When I got part way through he interrupted me and said that
I understand I know what you mean you want to look through
the van it is okay, and he said that in English and I knew
that he understood at that point and I let him sign the
form.
(R. 137).

Defendant also testified that he in fact understood

the request to search his van and voluntarily consented to the
search (R. 105-06).

The search of the van revealed approximately

383 pounds of marijuana concealed in the van (R. 90, 138).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has failed to included tl*e trial transcript as a
part of the record, consequently, it is impossible to determine
if an objection to the admission of the evidence was renewed at
trial, thus preserving the issue on appeal.

Because defendant

has not established that the issue is properly preserved, this
Court may summarily dismiss the issue.
The search and seizure of the defendant in the present case
directly follows standards established by Utah Code Ann. § 77-76

(15) (1 982), and Adams v. Williams

.

• ) and State

'r*-*v

*

Nc officer based his

v, Whittenback

^"l

*•?* ~ ^

stop of the defendant

objective facts supporting a reasonable
o b s e rv i i i g t ./ ::: 11: a f f I c \ i o 1 a 1: i o n s ;

s u s p i (i i o i it c

" i v i t;; >

and searched

defendant's vehicle

onlj

after

the

defendant

voluntarily and unambiguously consented to the search.
Because

defendant

voluntarily

consented

tc

tl le search

by

signing a consent to search form, the evidence obtained should be
admissible even if no probable cause had existed.
Since the defendant does not argue that an analysis of the
issues

would

have

different

outcome

under

s h o u 11 d f o c \ i s e x c 1 u s i v e 1 }

c o n s t i t u t i o i i t: h i s C"" c '

the

state

D I i 11 I e federal

constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE PRESERVED HIS
OBJECTION AT TRIAL TO THE ADMISSION OF THE SEIZED EVIDENCE
SO AS TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
Appellant has failed to make the trial transcript a par t of

this appeal, consequently, it is impossible to known whether an
objection to the seized evidence was renewed during the trial.
Ar i appeal, appellant

carries the burden of establishing that the

objection was renewed.
App. 1987),

State v. Holyoak, 74 3 p.2d 791, 7 92 (Utah

State v. Johnson. No, 20814, slip op, at 10

(Utah

Dec. 31, 1987) (Justice Durham concurring joined by Justices Howe
and Zimmerman)
has held that

lolyoak,
"a s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i o n

where a pretrial motion t
792 , q u o t i n g

State

v.

M

T1 i.e I Jt .ah Sup- ti emc

[at t

^

tequired

suppress has been made,*"

Lesley,

6 72
7

I > 2d

79 , 82

rt
even

H o l y o a k at
( I J1 a) i 1983) .

Holyoak further held, that the motion must be renewed at trial,
even when the same judge who presided over the trial heard the
motion to suppress.

Holyoak at 792; See. Johnson at 10.

Because defendant has not included the trial transcript as a
part of the record and has not shown that the issue is properly
preserved

for

appellate

review

the

issue

on

appeal

may be

summarily dismissed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
DEFENDANT'S VAN AFTER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY STOPPED AND
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH.
The guarantees

of the Fourth Amendment

are

intended

to

protect citizens not from all searches and seizures but rather
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1, 9

(1968).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

In judging the reasonableness of a particular

search and seizure, it has become well established that a court
"will

not

disturb

admissibility

the

ruling

of

the

trial

court

on

the

of evidence unless it clearly appears that the

lower court was in error."

State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209

(Utah 1985); See, State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983);
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
A review of the present case calls for consideration of i)
whether Officer Rawlinson was justified in pulling the defendant
over

after

observing

two

separate

and

independent

traffic

violations, and ii) whether the defendant's consent to the search
was properly obtained.

8

STOPPING T H E DEFENDANT
off JPPT
transmission
obse

***

tne

uefendant

following

a n o t h e r car while travel
33).'

f

- -

• " tr hearing

radio

natching

+*«

defendant's,

he

within

two

car

of

lengths
(R.

>

132-

T h i n k i n g t h i s distance u n s a f e , the officer m a d e a U-turn

through the median and began to follow the d e f e n d a n t .
van

the

was

in sight, the offi cer

it-

tilled

that

In

When the

unserved

the

defendant w e a v i n g between the emergency lane and right driving
1 ar ie(

crossii ig

at least

four t i m e s ,

leading him

to

believe the defendant may be driving while- intox icaLc-d (R. 133-

I Jtal :t Co

-

7 7-7 15 (108.M s t a t e s ,

ft peace officer may stop any p e r s o n in a p u b l i c p l a c e when
he has a reasonable suspicion to b e l i e v e he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand h i s name, address and an
e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s a c t i o n s .
Officer R a w l i n s o n ' s observations clearly supported a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant may have been
Code

Ann

§

41-6-44

( 1 "Uf /) , di J v i F \

in v i o l a t i o n of Utah

wh i I P

inf ox i eated,

making h i s stop of the defendant r e a s o n a b l e .
The 1,'lah Supreme court in State v. W h i t t e n b a c k . 621 P. 2d 103
(Utah 1 9 8 0 ) , h a s stated:
W h e n a p o l i c e officer sees or hears conduct w h i c h g i v e s rise
t o suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but the
duty to m a k e o b s e r v a t i o n s and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s to determine
w h e t h e r the law is being violated; and i f so, to take
m e a s u r e s as are necessary i n the enforcement of tt ne law.
State

Whittenback at

1125 (Utah -9771.

105, quoting State v. F o l k e s . 565 P.2d

"Though theie. may hr mo probable cause to make
9

thus

an arrest, a officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for investigating possible
criminal

activity.

Id.

at

105.

An

analysis

of

Officer

Rawlinson's actions in light of Whittenback suggest not only that
his actions were reasonable, but that a failure to investigate
defendant's behavior may have constituted neglect on the part of
the officer.
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that
probable cause sufficient for arrest is not nec€>ssary in order
for an officer to make an investigatory stop.

Adams v. Williams,

407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks
the precise level of information necessary for probable
cause to arrest to simply shrug his should€>rs and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary,
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police
work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts
known to the officer at the time.
Adams at 145, 146.
Taken together, Utah statutory law and the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, and the Utah Supreme Court in Adams
and Whittenback, clearly support the actions of Officer Rawlinson
as eminently reasonable.
could

have been

imputed

Further, even if an improper motive
to Officer Rawlinson's

stopping

the

defendant, the court in United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704,
708-09

(11th Cir. 1986), stated that an improper motive alone

will not invalidate an objectively reasonable stop, for instance,
a stop based upon the probable cause of an observed traffic
violation.
10

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718
Truiillo,

60 Utah

Aih

l

ii'-pf

.t»

(Utah 1985) and State v.

|Unu),

upon which

defendant

relies, are clearly distinguishable fr om the facts of this case.
In Tru ;i 11lo the officer based his stop and subsequent search
c-

defendant

on

vague

and

factors.4

unspecific

The

court

specifically noted that the officer did not witness the defendant
"violate
behavior

t rat f ic

any
,f

o

Truiillo at 52.

inres

ob j e c t i v e

criminal activity. 5

£ac ts

fMiiq.iqe

in

any

cr iminal

The reasonableness of the subsequent

search was therefore suspect.
t a s e cl o n

oi

In the present case, the stop was
v* I \ i i • \ l

'1 c? 11

1 1 i <= • o f f i z e i:

t :> suspect

Additionally, the search was conducted only

after the defendant voluntarily signed a consent to search form.
. Truiillo

•**

.-•;*-!-.

fficer,

"took hold of Trujillo, told him, to place hi s hands on the patrol
car and spread his feet, and patted down the outer surfaces of
Tru j i11of s c1oth i ng."
Likewise,
subsequently

*

searched

Truiillo at 52.

Swanigan,

defendant's
iny ub |cjct j w

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

wer e

stopped

and

farts support Inq a

Swanigan at 718-19.

4

11 ie factors offered by the officer were I) it was a highcrime area, ii) the lateness of the hour, iii) the apparent
nervous conduct of the trio (including defendant) , and iv) the
"suspicious nylon knapsack" defendant carried.
5

Officer Rawlinson stated he observed the defendant
following too closely to the vehicle while traveling about 55-60
m.p.h. and weaving between the emergency and right lane at least
four times.
The officer suspected the defendant was driving
while intoxicated and for that reason activated his lights and
pulled the defendant over. (R 132-34).

11

Defendant's argument that the stop by the second officer,
after observing two traffic violations should be invalidated,
because the first officer lacked objective facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion when he called ahead, is without merit•

As

the trial court correctly determined, objective facts supporting
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were present when
Officer Rawlinson pulled the defendant over (R. 144-147).
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH
It is "well settled that one of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable
cause

is

a

search

that

is

conducted

pursuant

to consent."

Schneckloth v Bustomonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
The Utah Supreme Court in Whittenback. expounded on the
requirements of a search conducted pursuant to consent.

The

court stated that although the prosecution has the burden of
establishing

from the totality of* the circumstances that the

consent was voluntarily given, it is not required to prove that
the defendant knew of his right to refuse to consent in order to
show

voluntariness.

Whittenback,

Whittenback,

defendants

pursuant

consent, but

to

voluntarily given.

conceded
claimed

621

that
that

P. 2d
the
the

at

search

105.
was

In
made

consent was not

In response, the court analyzed five factors

which guide the determination of voluntariness showing a lack of
duress or coercion.
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4)cooperation by the
owner of the vehicle; and 5; the absence of deception or
12

trick on the part of the officer. In the instant case, when
Officer Geslison asked defendants for permission to search
the automobile, all he had done was ask them for their
identification and ask preliminary questions.
Defendants
were not in custody at the time, and although Officers Mock
and Leatham arrived before consent was given, Mock did not
enter the laundromat and Leatham entered just as consent was
being given, thus, the presence of additional officers did
not create an undue show of authority
When Officer
Geslison requested permission to search, he did not claim
any authority to search or deceive defendants into thinking
he had a search warrant. He simply asked if he could search
the automobile, to which Parrett responded "Yes," or "Yes,
you can go ahead and search it."
Finally, none of the
officers used force 01 : threats of force to obtain the
consent.
Under the totality of circumstances test, the
state met its burden of proving that the consent to search
the automobile was voluntarily given.
Whittenback

footnotes omitted)

The facts .
more favorable *

^resent case are remarkably similar, if not
those described in Whittenback.

t c! s e a i c I i 1:

Before asking

- e f e n d a n t w a s :i it o t i i i c u s t o d > a i i d h a d been

asked only preliminary questions.

Only two officers were present

when the search was conducted and the record indicates that the
s econd

o f £ i ce r

a rr i "/ed

o i 11 >

s t 1 o i: 11 y

b e £c r e,

after, the consent form was signed (R. 137).

a i id

e v c= i i perhaps

Officer Rawlinson

was clear and explicit in explaining the consent form and made no
claim of authority or attempt

tc deceive the defendant.

The

officer , 1 ike the officer ii i Whittenback, simply inquired if he
could search the vehicle and he received an affirmative response

The present case
present defendant
consent.

dot ,-, , : cli 11 lem|<» the voluntary nature of his

Instead, defendant readily acknowledges that he gave

consent and that
undei

different from Whittenback in that the

the riici

•-'

.-

>luntary
-

isent
13

(R. 105-06,

137).

Clearly,

shoulil be consider ed valid

and

the

evidence

thereby

obtained

not violative

the of the

defendant's constitutional rights.
Even if there were no probable cause to stop the defendant,
the voluntary consent given by the defendant would compel the
admission of the evidence.

In United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d

1141 (10th Cir. 1986), the government's request for defendant's
consent

to

search

was

motivated

by

illegally

obtained

information, but the police did not use the fruits of the primary
illegality to coerce the defendant into giving his consent.

The

Tenth Circuit found that where the defendant's subsequent consent
to search was voluntarily given, free of police exploitation of
the primary illegality and by means sufficiently distinguishable
to purge the taint of the prior illegality, the seized evidence
was admissible.

Id.

at 1147-51.

In State v. Angel, 356 So. 2d

986 (La. 1978), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that "a
voluntary consent to search, given after illegal detention, is
valid

under circumstances which

illegality."

Angel at 989.

show no exploitation

of the

The court further said, "there

should be no distinction between a legal arrest and an illegal
one,

because

decisive."

"it

is

the

voluntariness

of

consent

which

is

Angel at 989 (emphasis in original).

In the present case there can be no question but that the
defendant gave his voluntary consent allowing his van to be
searched.
evidence

The record never intimates or suggests otherwise.
obtained

through

the

search

admissible.

14

should,

therefore,

The
be

III. BECAUSE DEFENDANT LIMITS HIS ARGUMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION A N D FAILS TO BRIEF THE ISSUES UNDER UTAH'S
CONSTITUTION THE COURT'S ANALYSIS SHOULD FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
The Utah

Supreme

Court

through

- series of opinions

has

indicated that arguments for different analysis under the state
and f fj,diM".! i i "urist 1 f u I i mi should be considei
Earl, 716 P,2d 80)
264, 271-71

nl

i!

rade.

State v.

805-06 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , State v. Hygh, 711 P 2d

(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) , State v. Laffertv, N o . 20740, slip op.

a I:: 1 ] n l > (U t a h J a n

1]

I n Laffertv, 11 :i e c o \ 11: t a f f i rm e d

] 9 8 8)

its position that if defendant does not argue that the analysis
of the issues under the Utah Constitution would be different from
its

ana1 > sIs

u nde i

the

f ederal

constitutional analysis is necessary.

constitution,

no

state

Lafferty at 11.

Defendant i n t h e case at bar cites t h e IJ t a h C o n s t i t u t: i c > n ,
but does not argue for a separate state constitutional

analysis

and the Court should, therefore, consider only his federal claim.
State v. Egbert, Mi id an A<r

kepi '>, , 'i 1 in „ ) |„ 1987 JI

(l

State v.

Hackford. 737 P.2d 2 0 0 , 205 n.3 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) , State v. Dorsev. 731
P.2d 1085, 1091 n.l (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , Lafferty at 14.
CONCLUSION
HdM 1 I nun M M

Ihieqninq rt i quiiii nl . , time M dt P

respectfully

requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
Dated this

/^T

day of February, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
E A R L F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
15

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postcige prepaid, to
Claudia Laycock, Attorney for Appellant, 43 East 200 North
P.O. Box

,f

L", Provo, Utah 84603, this

1988.

16

I^XJT

day of February,

